# Somalia / Al-Shabaab
- Canonical dossier: [Web edition]()
- Markdown edition: [Plain-text edition]()
- Issue: Issue 008
- Rubric: Compound Emergency / Scarcity
- Byline: Totally Fine Foundation editorial desk
- Reading time: 10 min
- Last reviewed: 2026-07-06
> One emergency, budgeted downward. OCHA counts 4.8 million people in need, then narrows the promise to 2.4 million targeted, 1.6 million prioritised, and 577,000 actually reached — while a drought and an insurgency drive the same families from home and no single number holds them all.
## Cover
- Kicker: Field dossier / Africa / conflict + drought
- Cover lines: 4.8 million in need, 577,000 reached. Both are true. / The lowest harvest in thirty years, and a war that came back. / Three of every four newly displaced fled the drought, not the front. / 'Defeat in five months' was declared in 2022. The map says otherwise.
#### Hero visual provenance
- Caption: Dolow, Somalia, 2012: a young woman waits for food aid in an earlier drought. By 2026 a failed rainy season and a returning insurgency were driving the same families from home.
- Alt text: A young woman waits to receive food aid in Dolow, Somalia, 2012.
- Credit: DFID — UK Department for International Development
- Rights / license: CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
## Metrics
### 4.8M — People in need (2026)
- Category: humanitarian need
- Caveat: OCHA/HCT planning estimate, down 20% on 2025 — a stricter definition of needs, not improvement. The first of four distinct caseload tiers that are never summed.
**Source trail:** [UN OCHA — Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026]() (`som-ocha-hnrp-2026`)
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: The first of four tiers.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: four caseload tiers.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### 577,000 — People reached (by Apr 2026)
- Category: humanitarian response
- Caveat: About 24% of the 2.4M target; 1.6M prioritised across 21 of 90 districts. The four tiers (need / targeted / prioritised / reached) never sum; the narrowing is funding, not diminished need.
**Source trail:** [UN OCHA — Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026]() (`som-ocha-hnrp-2026`)
### 6M — Acute food insecurity (IPC), projected
- Category: food security
- Caveat: Apr–Jun 2026 projection incl. 1.9M in Emergency; up from a 3.4M Jul–Sep 2025 snapshot (624k Emergency). Snapshot ≠ projection; Emergency is a subset, not an addition; a classification, not a casualty count.
**Source trail:** [IPC / FSNAU-Somalia (FAO) — Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (IPC / FSNAU-Somalia)]() (`som-ipc-2025`); [UN OCHA — Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026]() (`som-ocha-hnrp-2026`)
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Snapshot and projection, kept apart.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: IPC phases.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original sources linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### 500,000+ — New drought displacement (2026)
- Category: displacement
- Caveat: Over 90% attributed to drought by the authorities, on top of ~3.3M already uprooted. IOM finds drought behind 3 of 4 new displacements in five assessed districts (~62,000). Compound; shares attributed, not asserted.
**Source trail:** [UN OCHA — Somalia 2025–2026 Drought Emergency Situation Report No. 5]() (`som-ocha-drought-2026`); [IOM — Displacement Tracking Matrix — IOM Somalia]() (`som-iom-dtm-2026`)
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Drought and war, separately attributed.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: two engines of displacement.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original sources linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### 19.8% — 2026 appeal funded
- Category: funding
- Caveat: Of a US$852M HNRP (end-May); WFP short US$131M, reaching one in ten. The 40% budget cut is a narrower scope, not reduced need; keep the drought plan separate from the overall appeal.
**Source trail:** [UN OCHA — Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026]() (`som-ocha-hnrp-2026`); [World Food Programme — Somalia emergency — WFP]() (`som-wfp-2026`)
### ~one-third — Territory Al-Shabaab holds
- Category: security / assessment
- Caveat: Reversed most 2022–23 gains after Feb 2025, reclaimed 2019-era ground, within ~50 km of Mogadishu; has not taken the capital. Retains asymmetric-attack capacity; gains 'vulnerable to reversal' — a qualitative Council assessment, not a count.
**Source trail:** [United Nations Security Council — UN Security Council on Somalia]() (`som-unsc-2026`)
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: The war that came back.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: the insurgency's resurgence.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
## A plan built for scarcity.
### The plan that budgets itself downward
OCHA files Somalia's 2026 emergency as an act of triage. It counts 4.8 million people in need — and then, under an appeal 40 per cent thinner than the year before, narrows the promise to 2.4 million targeted, 1.6 million prioritised across just 21 of the country's 90 districts, and, by the end of April, 577,000 actually reached, about a quarter of the target. These are four different realities, and the plan is careful not to let them blur.
The smaller in-need figure, OCHA says, reflects a stricter definition of needs, not an improving crisis; the smaller budget reflects constrained resources, not diminished needs. By the end of May the appeal was 19.8 per cent funded. WFP put the gap in plainer terms: it can reach only one in ten people in need. The arithmetic of scarcity is the frame for everything under it.
**Source trail:** [UN OCHA — Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026]() (`som-ocha-hnrp-2026`); [World Food Programme — Somalia emergency — WFP]() (`som-wfp-2026`)
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Four realities, never summed.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: four caseload tiers.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### Two engines, one map
Underneath the ledger sit two drivers that interact and must not be collapsed into one. The first is a drought — three failed rainy seasons, a southern cereal harvest 83 per cent below its thirty-year average, the lowest in a generation. It pushed more than 500,000 people from home in 2026 alone, on top of roughly 3.3 million already uprooted; OCHA and the authorities attribute over 90 per cent of that new movement to the dry, and IOM, tracking five of the hardest-hit districts, found drought behind three of every four new displacements.
The second engine is the war. Human Rights Watch, counting the same year, found over half of 300,000 newly displaced people had fled conflict and insecurity — not the whole, and not the drought's share. The lived reality is compound: OCHA records families displaced repeatedly by both, one woman fleeing five times, three from fighting and twice from the drought. Each figure belongs to the body that established it; neither driver alone explains the crisis.
**Source trail:** [UN OCHA — Somalia 2025–2026 Drought Emergency Situation Report No. 5]() (`som-ocha-drought-2026`); [IOM — Displacement Tracking Matrix — IOM Somalia]() (`som-iom-dtm-2026`); [Human Rights Watch — World Report 2026: Somalia]() (`som-hrw-2026`)
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Neither driver alone explains it.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: two engines.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original sources linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### Hunger, counted in phases
The clearest reading of the damage comes from the IPC, which classifies hunger by severity rather than headline. Its September 2025 analysis put 3.4 million people in Crisis or worse for the July–September window, including 624,000 in Emergency, and classified nobody in Phase 5 — catastrophe — for that period. By the spring the projection had climbed: OCHA's May 2026 update carried an IPC figure of 6 million in high acute food insecurity for April–June, including 1.9 million in Emergency, with nearly 1.88 million children needing treatment for acute malnutrition.
The two are different vintages and must not be blended, and the Emergency count is a subset of the larger total, not an addition to it. The malnutrition caseload is a separate measure again, on its own calendar. What the phases show is a food crisis deepening while the money to answer it thins.
**Source trail:** [IPC / FSNAU-Somalia (FAO) — Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (IPC / FSNAU-Somalia)]() (`som-ipc-2025`); [UN OCHA — Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026]() (`som-ocha-hnrp-2026`)
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Deepening as the money thins.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: IPC phases.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original sources linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### The insurgency that came back
The war is not winding down. After its offensive of 20 February 2025, Al-Shabaab reversed most of the government's 2022–2023 gains, reclaimed ground it had not held since 2019, and advanced to within roughly 50 kilometres of Mogadishu. The Security Council's mid-2026 assessment is blunt: the group continues to retain the capacity to conduct asymmetric attacks, including through improvised explosive devices, ambushes and economic coercion, and it judges recaptured territory vulnerable to reversal.
That undercuts a specific claim. In 2022 the Federal Government declared total war and predicted eliminating Al-Shabaab within five months, later within a year; the timelines were not met and much of the ground was lost again. The group has also not taken and held the capital, and it controls something closer to a third of the country than the whole. One event that is easy to file wrong: the March 2026 federal takeover of Baidoa was a clash between federal and South-West state forces, not an Al-Shabaab operation.
**Source trail:** [United Nations Security Council — UN Security Council on Somalia]() (`som-unsc-2026`); [ACLED — Somalia / Horn of Africa political violence]() (`som-acled-2026`)
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: 'Defeat in five months' was not met.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: the insurgency.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### A mission in transition, and harm in separate columns
The international presence around the war is being reconfigured, and the difference from a withdrawal matters. On 1 January 2025 the African Union's ATMIS gave way to AUSSOM, renewed in December to 31 December 2026 at an authorised ceiling of 11,826, with the UN political mission set to close on 31 October 2026 — a change of mission configuration, not a full exit, but one unfolding under an acknowledged UN liquidity crisis and a force stretched across 49 locations against the 23 its plan envisaged.
The record of civilian harm is real and belongs to more than one actor. ACLED documents an Al-Shabaab campaign in March 2026 that killed at least 47 people, and keeps soldiers, militants and civilians as separate categories, never merged. Human Rights Watch attributes the highest numbers of civilian casualties to Al-Shabaab — without a single total — while separately documenting government-force actions, including police detaining at least 22 journalists after the 18 March convoy bombing. Two lethal strikes on families in Puntland it reports only as unidentified; this dossier states no perpetrator as fact. Each account is attributed to the body that made it; none is set as equal to another by placement alone.
**Source trail:** [African Union — AUSSOM mission — African Union]() (`som-aussom-2026`); [ACLED — Somalia / Horn of Africa political violence]() (`som-acled-2026`); [Human Rights Watch — World Report 2026: Somalia]() (`som-hrw-2026`)
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Attributed, and never averaged.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: harm in separate columns.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
## Actors and positions
### Al-Shabaab (Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen)
- Role: The al-Qaeda-aligned insurgency that reclaimed 2019-era ground after February 2025.
- Confidence: high
- Position: Presents itself as a religiously legitimate resistance governing on behalf of Somalis and expelling foreign occupation; in 2025–26 signalled reconciliation to some communities and announced a drought-relief committee.
- Supporter framing: Frames its rule as order and justice where the state is absent.
- Opposing account: The Federal Government, AU and Western partners class it a terrorist organisation that taxes herders, conscripts and blocks aid.
- Independent assessment: Independent analysts describe a resurgent insurgency that reclaimed 2019-era ground after February 2025 but has not taken the capital and holds roughly a third of the country. Its own statements are recorded as position only, paraphrased, never amplified.
**Source trail:** [United Nations Security Council — UN Security Council on Somalia]() (`som-unsc-2026`); [ACLED — Somalia / Horn of Africa political violence]() (`som-acled-2026`)
### Federal Government of Somalia / Somali National Army
- Role: The internationally recognised government prosecuting the counterinsurgency and the primary humanitarian interlocutor.
- Confidence: high
- Position: Frames the war as a national campaign to eradicate Al-Shabaab; declared 'total war' in 2022.
- Supporter framing: Presents the offensive as a state-building campaign backed by clan uprisings.
- Opposing account: Rights bodies document government-force conduct — journalist detentions, renewed reliance on clan militia.
- Independent assessment: Its 2022 elimination timelines were not met and 2025 saw most gains reversed; analysts describe the army as heavily reliant on AUSSOM and external support. HRW documents police detaining at least 22 journalists after the March 2026 convoy bombing.
**Source trail:** [Human Rights Watch — World Report 2026: Somalia]() (`som-hrw-2026`); [United Nations Security Council — UN Security Council on Somalia]() (`som-unsc-2026`)
### AUSSOM / African Union and partners
- Role: The AU stabilisation mission plus bilateral and multilateral backers (US, Türkiye, EU, UN).
- Confidence: medium
- Position: Frames its role as supporting a Somali-led process, with the stated objective to degrade and ultimately defeat Al-Shabaab and hand full security to Somali forces by 2029.
- Supporter framing: Presents the transition as a responsible handover backed by predictable financing.
- Opposing account: Analysts note the transition unfolds amid a UN liquidity crisis and unresolved AUSSOM funding.
- Independent assessment: The ATMIS→AUSSOM shift is a transition of mission, renewed to 31 December 2026 at a ceiling of 11,826, not a full exit — but it unfolds under a UN liquidity crisis, with the force stretched across 49 locations against the 23 its plan envisaged. Durability is uncertain.
**Source trail:** [African Union — AUSSOM mission — African Union]() (`som-aussom-2026`); [United Nations Security Council — UN Security Council on Somalia]() (`som-unsc-2026`)
### Drought-affected civilians, pastoralists and IDPs
- Role: The population bearing the compound emergency — displaced repeatedly by both conflict and drought.
- Confidence: high
- Position: Survival priorities are food, water, protection and safe return; some Macawiisley communities accepted Al-Shabaab non-aggression terms in 2025 after the state could not hold recaptured areas.
- Supporter framing: Humanitarian actors emphasise protection and the compound nature of the emergency.
- Opposing account: Armed actors on all sides cast civilian displacement as the other's doing or as drought alone.
- Independent assessment: OCHA reports about 4.8 million in need and over 500,000 newly displaced in 2026, most by drought; families are displaced repeatedly by both drivers. The side with the heaviest documented evidential weight as victims, not a belligerent.
**Source trail:** [UN OCHA — Somalia 2025–2026 Drought Emergency Situation Report No. 5]() (`som-ocha-drought-2026`); [IOM — Displacement Tracking Matrix — IOM Somalia]() (`som-iom-dtm-2026`)
## Claims and evidence
### Somalia's emergency is mainly a drought crisis rather than a conflict crisis.
- Claimant: Common single-driver framing
- Evidence status: confirmed
- Counterclaim: OCHA attributes most 2026 displacement to drought while naming Al-Shabaab and inter-clan clashes as drivers of violence and access loss.
- Independent assessment: Confirmed as a compound emergency: drought and conflict are inseparable for access and displacement even though measured differently; analysts note the two are increasingly intertwined. Neither alone explains it.
**Source trail:** [UN OCHA — Somalia 2025–2026 Drought Emergency Situation Report No. 5]() (`som-ocha-drought-2026`); [IOM — Displacement Tracking Matrix — IOM Somalia]() (`som-iom-dtm-2026`)
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Compound, not single-driver.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: two engines.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original sources linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### Al-Shabaab has been strategically defeated or is near elimination.
- Claimant: 2022 Federal Government 'total war' framing
- Evidence status: disputed
- Counterclaim: After February 2025 the group reversed most 2022–23 gains and advanced within ~50 km of Mogadishu.
- Independent assessment: Disputed: the Council says the group continues to retain the capacity to conduct asymmetric attacks, and the 2022 'defeat in five months' prediction did not materialise. Not supported.
**Source trail:** [United Nations Security Council — UN Security Council on Somalia]() (`som-unsc-2026`); [ACLED — Somalia / Horn of Africa political violence]() (`som-acled-2026`)
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: The map says otherwise.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: the insurgency.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### The AU transition (ATMIS→AUSSOM) means international involvement is winding down.
- Claimant: Common reading of the transition
- Evidence status: likely
- Counterclaim: Resolution 2809 renewed AUSSOM to 31 December 2026 and it continues, with UNSOS and bilateral deployments.
- Independent assessment: Likely misread: a transition of mission, not a withdrawal — but under a UN liquidity crisis and unresolved funding, so durability is uncertain.
**Source trail:** [African Union — AUSSOM mission — African Union]() (`som-aussom-2026`); [United Nations Security Council — UN Security Council on Somalia]() (`som-unsc-2026`)
### The Macawiisley clan militias are reliable pro-government partners against Al-Shabaab.
- Claimant: Counterinsurgency framing
- Evidence status: disputed
- Counterclaim: Some Macawiisley reached non-aggression pacts with Al-Shabaab in 2025 after the state failed to hold recaptured areas.
- Independent assessment: Disputed: central to the 2022–23 offensive, allegiance is contingent on local protection and time-dependent, so the claim overgeneralises.
**Source trail:** [United Nations Security Council — UN Security Council on Somalia]() (`som-unsc-2026`)
## Language record
### UN OCHA
- Role: Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026
- Context: On why the in-need figure fell to 4.8 million — a stricter definition, not improvement.
Quotation text is available in the web edition and the cited original source; it is not republished in this machine-readable edition.
**Source:** [UN OCHA — Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026]() (`som-ocha-hnrp-2026`)
### UN OCHA
- Role: Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026
- Context: On the 40 per cent-thinner appeal.
Quotation text is available in the web edition and the cited original source; it is not republished in this machine-readable edition.
**Source:** [UN OCHA — Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026]() (`som-ocha-hnrp-2026`)
### World Food Programme
- Role: Somalia emergency
- Context: On the funding gap of US$131 million.
Quotation text is available in the web edition and the cited original source; it is not republished in this machine-readable edition.
**Source:** [World Food Programme — Somalia emergency — WFP]() (`som-wfp-2026`)
### UN Security Council
- Role: Somalia forecast
- Context: The Council's mid-2026 assessment, undercutting the 2022 'defeat' prediction.
Quotation text is available in the web edition and the cited original source; it is not republished in this machine-readable edition.
**Source:** [United Nations Security Council — UN Security Council on Somalia]() (`som-unsc-2026`)
### IOM
- Role: Displacement Tracking Matrix
- Context: Across five assessed districts, a 22 per cent increase on the previous year.
Quotation text is available in the web edition and the cited original source; it is not republished in this machine-readable edition.
**Source:** [IOM — Displacement Tracking Matrix — IOM Somalia]() (`som-iom-dtm-2026`)
### Human Rights Watch
- Role: World Report 2026
- Context: The conflict share of displacement, distinct from the drought's.
Quotation text is available in the web edition and the cited original source; it is not republished in this machine-readable edition.
**Source:** [Human Rights Watch — World Report 2026: Somalia]() (`som-hrw-2026`)
## Timeline
### 2022-08-01 — FGS launches major anti-Shabaab offensive
- Event type: conflict\_escalation
- Confidence: high
The Federal Government of Somalia, backed by clan militia and ATMIS, launched a major offensive against al-Shabaab across central and south-central Somalia, recapturing significant territory including parts of Middle Shabelle and Hirshabelle.
**Source trail:** [ACLED — Somalia — ACLED Data]() (`src-somalia-acled`)
### 2026-04-20 — ATMIS accelerates drawdown; transition to Somali national security forces
- Event type: international\_response
- Confidence: high
The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) confirmed acceleration of its drawdown per the December 2024 AU Peace and Security Council decision. Final withdrawal is expected by end of 2026, raising concerns about the Somali security forces' capacity to hold recaptured territory.
**Source trail:** [UNOCHA — Somalia Crisis — UNOCHA]() (`src-somalia-ocha`); [ACLED — Somalia — ACLED Data]() (`src-somalia-acled`)
## Visual essay
### Gallery image 01
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Al-Shabaab has not taken and held the capital, but by 2025 had advanced to within roughly 50 kilometres of Mogadishu.
- Alt text: A view of Mogadishu, Somalia.
- Credit: AMISOM Public Information
- Rights / license: CC0 / public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### Gallery image 02
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: WFP can reach only one in ten people in need; the 2026 appeal was 19.8 per cent funded by the end of May.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: the 2026 appeal 19.8 per cent funded, WFP reaching one in ten.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
## Linked visual references
### World Report 2026: Somalia
- Photographer: Human Rights Watch
- Publisher: Human Rights Watch
- Recognition: Annual human-rights review
- Why it matters: The record that keeps civilian harm disaggregated by actor — attributing the highest numbers to Al-Shabaab while separately documenting government-force conduct.
- Original: [Open reference]()
#### Harm, kept in separate columns.
Human Rights Watch attributes the highest numbers of civilian casualties to Al-Shabaab without a single total, while documenting police detentions and unattributed strikes at the same standard.
The reference matters because Somalia's harm belongs to more than one actor, and the honest reading keeps them attributed and unequal, not averaged.
It is an advocacy monitor, not a court; where a strike's perpetrator is not established, HRW says so, and this dossier states no perpetrator as fact. Figures are documented, not comprehensive tolls.
## Media desk
### Somalia — locator and regions
- Publisher: Wikimedia Commons
- Creator: Wikimedia Commons contributors
- Date: Maintained file
- Media type: map
- Rights mode: direct\_image
- Placement: Orientation map / geography
- Caption: Geography orients the two engines: the southern regions where the harvest failed, and the central and southern ground the insurgency reclaimed after February 2025.
- Why it matters: A rights-safe locator; geography context, not a claim of control on any given day.
The map belongs early because the crisis is territorial in two ways at once — where the drought bites and where the war moved back in. It orients rather than certifies any front line.
- Original: [Open media record]()
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Somalia's federal states and regions: the war reverted, by 2025, to roughly its 2022 shape, with Al-Shabaab holding closer to a third of the country than the whole.
- Alt text: Map of Somalia showing its federal member states and regions.
- Credit: Wikimedia Commons contributors
- Rights / license: Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### A plan that budgets itself downward
- Publisher: UN OCHA
- Creator: Totally Fine Foundation
- Date: 2026
- Media type: infographic
- Rights mode: linked\_reference\_only
- Placement: Humanitarian data surface
- Caption: The single most important discipline in reading Somalia's plan: in need, targeted, prioritised and reached are four separate caseloads that narrow under scarcity — never a single number.
- Why it matters: The plan is careful not to let the four tiers blur; the surface holds them apart, each captioned by tier.
The surface exists because the arithmetic of scarcity is the whole frame. A crisis of 4.8 million is met, in practice, at 577,000 — and OCHA is explicit that the narrowing is money and definition, not an improving crisis.
- Original: [Open media record]()
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Four different realities, never summed: 4.8 million in need, 2.4 million targeted, 1.6 million prioritised across 21 of 90 districts, 577,000 actually reached by April — about a quarter of the target.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: 4.8 million in need narrowing to 2.4 million targeted, 1.6 million prioritised, 577,000 reached.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
## Source readings
### The plan that budgets itself downward.
- Registry ID: `som-ocha-hnrp-2026`
- Publisher: UN OCHA
- Source type: humanitarian
- Published: 2026-01-26
- Registry title: Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026
- Editorial note: The emergency filed as an act of triage — four caseload tiers, never summed.
- Original: [Open source]()
OCHA files Somalia's 2026 emergency as an act of triage, and is careful not to let the four caseloads blur.
It counts 4.8 million people in need — and then, under an appeal 40 per cent thinner than the year before, narrows the promise to 2.4 million targeted, 1.6 million prioritised across just 21 of the country's 90 districts, and, by the end of April, 577,000 actually reached, about a quarter of the target. These are four different realities.
The smaller in-need figure, OCHA says, reflects a stricter definition of needs, not an improving crisis; the smaller budget reflects constrained resources, not diminished needs. By the end of May the appeal was 19.8 per cent funded, and WFP put the gap in plainer terms: it can reach only one in ten people in need. The arithmetic of scarcity is the frame for everything under it.
#### Takeaways
- Four distinct caseload tiers — in need, targeted, prioritised, reached — never summed.
- The 20 per cent drop in need is a stricter definition, not improvement; the budget cut is constrained resources, not diminished need.
- The appeal was 19.8 per cent funded by end-May; rolling figures diverge upward from the January baseline.
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: In need, targeted, prioritised, reached — four realities.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: the four caseload tiers.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### Two engines, one map.
- Registry ID: `som-ocha-drought-2026`
- Publisher: UN OCHA
- Source type: humanitarian
- Published: 2026-04-06
- Registry title: Somalia 2025–2026 Drought Emergency Situation Report No. 5
- Editorial note: One of two engines — the drought — attributed, not asserted, and kept apart from the war.
- Original: [Open source]()
OCHA reports a drought driving mass displacement — the first of two drivers that interact and must not be collapsed into one.
It records at least five million people affected by the drought, with more than 500,000 displaced so far in 2026 — over 90 per cent of them by the dry, per the authorities — on top of roughly 3.3 million already uprooted. The driver is the failed 2025 Deyr rains and a southern cereal harvest 83 per cent below its thirty-year average, the lowest in a generation.
The lived reality is compound: OCHA records families displaced repeatedly by both drought and war, one woman fleeing five times, three from fighting and twice from the drought. Each figure belongs to the body that established it; the over-90-per-cent split is the source's, attributed not asserted.
#### Takeaways
- The affected and displaced headlines are the authorities' own-position estimates; the drought share is attributed, not asserted.
- '83 per cent' is a crop-harvest shortfall, not a rainfall deficit.
- Neither driver alone explains the crisis; drought and conflict are measured differently and kept apart.
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Two engines, one map: OCHA and the authorities attribute over 90 per cent of 2026's 500,000+ new displacements to the drought, while HRW finds over half of a separate 300,000 fled conflict — neither driver alone explains it.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: two engines — drought and conflict — driving displacement, separately attributed.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original sources linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### One in ten.
- Registry ID: `som-wfp-2026`
- Publisher: World Food Programme
- Source type: humanitarian
- Published: 2026-06-07
- Registry title: Somalia emergency — WFP
- Editorial note: Both responder and appellant — every figure its own, attributed.
- Original: [Open source]()
WFP renders the emergency as an assistance ledger running dry — and it is both responder and appellant, so every figure is its own.
It reports 6.5 million people projected to face crisis-level hunger or worse, including two million at emergency level, against three failed rainy seasons and the lowest seasonal crop harvest in 30 years. Its own reach has narrowed to one in ten people in need, and it warns assistance will halt by July without US$131 million.
The figures move across 2026 — the appeal from US$95 million to US$131 million, the halt month from April to July, the reach from one-in-seven to one-in-ten — so each must carry its date. Cash-transfer and nutrition caseloads are separate streams and are not summed.
#### Takeaways
- WFP is both responder and appellant — attribute every figure to it.
- Moving targets across 2026 must each be dated; do not blend the shifting appeal and halt-month figures.
- Cash-transfer and nutrition caseloads are separate streams, never added.
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: The money thins as the crisis deepens: the US$852 million plan was 19.8 per cent funded by end-May, and WFP — short US$131 million — can reach only one in ten people in need.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: the 2026 appeal 19.8 per cent funded; WFP reaching one in ten.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### Hunger, counted in phases.
- Registry ID: `som-ipc-2025`
- Publisher: IPC / FSNAU-Somalia (FAO)
- Source type: humanitarian
- Published: 2025-09-23
- Registry title: Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (IPC / FSNAU-Somalia)
- Editorial note: Hunger classified by severity — snapshot and projection kept apart, Emergency a subset.
- Original: [Open source]()
The IPC classifies hunger by severity rather than headline — and the two vintages must not be blended.
Its September 2025 analysis put 3.4 million people in Crisis or worse for the July–September window, including 624,000 in Emergency, and classified nobody in Phase 5 — catastrophe — for that period, rising to a projected 4.4 million by year-end. By the spring the projection had climbed: OCHA's May 2026 update carried an IPC figure of 6 million in high acute food insecurity for April–June, including 1.9 million in Emergency.
The two are different vintages and must not be blended, and the Emergency count is a subset of the larger total, not an addition to it. Nearly 1.88 million children need treatment for acute malnutrition — a separate measure again, on its own calendar. What the phases show is a food crisis deepening while the money to answer it thins.
#### Takeaways
- A food-security classification, not a casualty count; Phase 4 (Emergency) is a subset of Phase 3+, never added.
- Snapshot (3.4M, Jul–Sep 2025) and projection (6M, Apr–Jun 2026) are different vintages — do not blend.
- The malnutrition caseload is a distinct measure on its own window.
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Hunger in phases, not headlines: 3.4 million in Crisis or worse (Jul–Sep 2025, 624,000 in Emergency, none in Phase 5) rising to a projected 6 million (Apr–Jun 2026, 1.9 million in Emergency). Snapshot and projection are different vintages.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: 3.4 million in IPC Phase 3+ (Jul–Sep 2025) rising to 6 million projected (Apr–Jun 2026).
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original sources linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### The insurgency that came back.
- Registry ID: `som-unsc-2026`
- Publisher: United Nations Security Council
- Source type: official\_position
- Published: 2026-06-01
- Registry title: UN Security Council on Somalia
- Editorial note: The security picture in the Council's own voice — no humanitarian figures imported here.
- Original: [Open source]()
The Security Council's mid-2026 assessment is blunt: Al-Shabaab retains the capacity to fight, and its opponents' gains are vulnerable to reversal.
After its offensive of 20 February 2025, Al-Shabaab reversed most of the government's 2022–2023 gains, reclaimed ground it had not held since 2019, and advanced to within roughly 50 kilometres of Mogadishu. The Council judges that the group continues to retain the capacity to conduct asymmetric attacks, including through improvised explosive devices, ambushes and economic coercion, and calls recaptured territory vulnerable to reversal.
That undercuts a specific claim: in 2022 the Federal Government declared total war and predicted eliminating Al-Shabaab within five months, later within a year; the timelines were not met and much of the ground was lost again. One event that is easy to file wrong — the March 2026 federal takeover of Baidoa was a clash between federal and South-West state forces, not an Al-Shabaab operation.
#### Takeaways
- All security and territory framing is the Council's own, not independent field verification.
- This source carries no humanitarian or casualty figures — do not import them here.
- The March 2026 Baidoa takeover was a federal-vs-state clash, not an Al-Shabaab operation.
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: The insurgency that came back: after its 20 February 2025 offensive, Al-Shabaab reversed most 2022–23 government gains, reclaimed 2019-era ground, and advanced to within ~50 km of Mogadishu. The 2022 'defeat in five months' was not met.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: Al-Shabaab reversed 2022–23 gains after February 2025 and advanced within 50 km of Mogadishu.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### A mission in transition, not a retreat.
- Registry ID: `som-aussom-2026`
- Publisher: African Union
- Source type: official\_position
- Published: 2025-12-23
- Registry title: AUSSOM mission — African Union
- Editorial note: A transition of mission, not a full withdrawal — described as reconfigured and financially strained.
- Original: [Open source]()
The international presence around the war is being reconfigured, and the difference from a withdrawal matters.
On 1 January 2025 the African Union's ATMIS gave way to its successor, AUSSOM; in December 2025 the Security Council renewed AUSSOM to 31 December 2026 with an authorised ceiling of 11,826 uniformed personnel, and set the UN political mission, UNTMIS, to cease operations on 31 October 2026. This is a change of mission mandate and configuration, not a full international exit — UNSOS and bilateral deployments continue.
But it unfolds under strain: an acknowledged UN liquidity crisis, unresolved AUSSOM financing, and a force stretched across 49 locations against the 23 its own plan envisaged. The authorised ceiling is a legal figure, not a count of troops on the ground. Whether the backing proves durable is genuinely uncertain, which is why the reading here is reconfigured and financially strained, not withdrawing.
#### Takeaways
- Mandate and 'defeat' language are the AU's own position, not proof of outcome.
- The authorised ceiling of 11,826 is not deployed strength; the ATMIS→AUSSOM change is a transition, not a withdrawal.
- Funding figures conflict across periods — do not merge them; durability is uncertain.
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: A transition, not a retreat: ATMIS gave way to AUSSOM on 1 January 2025, renewed to 31 December 2026 at an authorised ceiling of 11,826 — but stretched across 49 locations against the 23 its plan envisaged, amid a UN liquidity crisis.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: ATMIS gives way to AUSSOM; an authorised ceiling of 11,826 stretched across 49 locations.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original sources linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### Harm, kept in separate columns.
- Registry ID: `som-acled-2026`
- Publisher: ACLED
- Source type: research
- Published: 2026-04-01
- Registry title: Somalia / Horn of Africa political violence
- Editorial note: A living dataset — soldiers, militants and civilians kept as separate categories.
- Original: [Open source]()
ACLED records an Al-Shabaab campaign and contested battle-death claims — and keeps soldiers, militants and civilians as separate categories.
It documents an Al-Shabaab campaign across southern and central Somalia in March 2026 that killed at least 47 people, including six shot in a public square at Kunyo Barrow, and a December 2025 clash in Lower Shabelle with 44 reported fatalities, 30 of them civilians. It also logs contested battle-death claims — 80 soldiers and 208 militants reported around Kudhaa in January — which are opposing-force counts, kept as separate categories and never merged.
It is a living dataset revised weekly, every figure period-stamped, and it captures security violence, not drought displacement. The Islamic State–Somalia is a distinct actor from Al-Shabaab and is coded separately.
#### Takeaways
- Every figure is period-stamped; soldiers, militants and civilians are separate categories, never summed.
- This source captures security violence, not drought displacement.
- The Islamic State–Somalia is a distinct actor from Al-Shabaab.
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Kept in separate columns: an Al-Shabaab campaign killing at least 47 people (six shot at Kunyo Barrow), a December 2025 clash with 44 fatalities (30 civilians), and contested battle-death claims — 80 soldiers, 208 militants near Kudhaa — never merged.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: ACLED's separately-kept counts of civilian deaths and contested battle-death claims.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### Attributed, and unequal.
- Registry ID: `som-hrw-2026`
- Publisher: Human Rights Watch
- Source type: human\_rights
- Published: 2026-01-16
- Registry title: World Report 2026: Somalia
- Editorial note: Harm disaggregated by actor — and no perpetrator stated as fact where none is established.
- Original: [Open source]()
Human Rights Watch keeps the harm disaggregated by actor, and states no perpetrator as fact where none is established.
It attributes the highest numbers of civilian casualties to Al-Shabaab — without a single total — while separately documenting government-force actions, including police detaining at least 22 journalists after the 18 March bombing of the presidential convoy, and the state's renewed reliance on clan militia. It records 4.4 million needing food aid, from rains, fighting and funding cuts combined.
Two lethal strikes on families in Puntland it reports only as unidentified or allegedly, perpetrator unestablished; this dossier records them as HRW did and states no perpetrator as fact. It is an advocacy monitor; the compound figures are not Al-Shabaab's alone.
#### Takeaways
- An advocacy monitor — attribute throughout; the compound figures are not Al-Shabaab's alone.
- Where a strike's perpetrator is not established, state none as fact.
- Al-Shabaab is attributed the highest civilian casualties, but government-force conduct is documented separately.
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Disaggregated by actor: HRW attributes the highest civilian casualties to Al-Shabaab (no single total), documents police detaining at least 22 journalists after the 18 March convoy bombing, and reports two lethal Puntland strikes only as 'unidentified' — perpetrator unestablished.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: HRW attributes the highest civilian casualties to Al-Shabaab while separately documenting government-force conduct and unattributed strikes.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### Three of every four fled the drought.
- Registry ID: `som-iom-dtm-2026`
- Publisher: IOM
- Source type: humanitarian
- Published: 2026-04-24
- Registry title: Displacement Tracking Matrix — IOM Somalia
- Editorial note: A district-scoped displacement count — not a national figure, and a projection where flagged.
- Original: [Open source]()
IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix scopes the drought's share precisely — to five assessed districts, not the nation.
It reports nearly 62,000 people displaced by drought across five assessed districts since the start of 2026, with drought now behind three of every four new displacements there — and projects nearly 125,000 more in the second quarter, even under normal rains. The drivers it names are depleted water, failed grazing and livestock loss after a poor Deyr season.
The 62,000 and 75 per cent figures cover only the five assessed districts, not the country; the 125,000 is a projection, not an observed count. Conflict displacement the DTM tracks separately, and IOM is a responder and appellant, so its framing is its own.
#### Takeaways
- The 62,000 and 75 per cent figures are scoped to five assessed districts, not national.
- The 125,000 is a projection, not an observed count.
- Conflict displacement is tracked separately; IOM is a responder and appellant — attribute its framing.
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Three of every four: across five assessed districts IOM finds drought behind 75 per cent of new displacements — nearly 62,000 since the start of 2026, with a projected 125,000 more in the second quarter. A district-scoped figure, not a national one.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: drought behind three of every four new displacements in five assessed districts.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
## Analysis shelf
### Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026
- Publisher: UN OCHA
- Type: report
- Why it matters: The four caseload tiers — in need, targeted, prioritised, reached — that must never be summed.
- Position note: Humanitarian planning source; the narrowing is money and definition, not an improving crisis.
- Original: [Open source]()
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: The plan met, in practice, at a quarter of its target.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: the 2026 appeal funding gap.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### World Report 2026: Somalia
- Publisher: Human Rights Watch
- Type: investigation
- Why it matters: Civilian harm disaggregated by actor — and no perpetrator stated as fact where none is established.
- Position note: Advocacy monitor; attributes the highest casualties to Al-Shabaab without a single total.
- Original: [Open source]()
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Attributed, and unequal.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: harm attributed.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### UN Security Council on Somalia
- Publisher: UN Security Council
- Type: official page
- Why it matters: The security assessment — Al-Shabaab's resurgence and the mission's strain — in the Council's own voice.
- Position note: Political-security source; carries no humanitarian or casualty figures.
- Original: [Open source]()
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Reconfigured and financially strained.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: the mission transition.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original sources linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (IPC / FSNAU)
- Publisher: IPC / FSNAU-Somalia (FAO)
- Type: dataset
- Why it matters: Hunger classified by severity, with snapshot and projection held as different vintages.
- Position note: Food-security consensus; a classification, not a casualty count.
- Original: [Open source]()
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: Severity, not headline.
- Alt text: Editorial data surface: IPC phases.
- Credit: Totally Fine Foundation
- Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original sources linked
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
## Media shelf
### Somalia — federal states and regions map
- Publisher: Wikimedia Commons
- Type: media
- Why it matters: A rights-safe locator for the two engines — where the harvest failed, and where the insurgency returned.
- Position note: Reusable CC BY-SA asset; geography, not battlefield control.
- Original: [Open source]()
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: The map orients the drought and the war.
- Alt text: Map of Somalia's federal member states and regions.
- Credit: Wikimedia Commons contributors
- Rights / license: Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
### Somalia emergency — WFP
- Publisher: World Food Programme
- Type: media
- Why it matters: The assistance ledger running dry — the money thinning as the food crisis deepens.
- Position note: Humanitarian source; both responder and appellant, figures attributed to WFP.
- Original: [Open source]()
#### Visual provenance
- Caption: The capital the insurgency never held.
- Alt text: A view of Mogadishu, Somalia.
- Credit: AMISOM Public Information
- Rights / license: CC0 / public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
- Asset: [View image]()
- Original / provenance: [Open source]()
## Open questions
- Keep the four caseload tiers apart at all times — in need (4.8M), targeted (2.4M), prioritised (1.6M), reached (577,000) — never summed, each captioned by tier; note the 20% drop as a stricter definition, not improvement.
- Present the compound framing so drought and conflict interact but are separately attributed — the \>90% / 75% drought shares to OCHA/IOM, the conflict share to HRW ('over half'), the security assessment to the Council — and never pin all displacement on Al-Shabaab.
- Keep the abuse axes attributed to their bodies (ACLED / HRW) with no false parity; hold Al-Shabaab as own-position (paraphrased); describe ATMIS→AUSSOM / UNTMIS as a transition of mission, not a withdrawal.
- Refresh the vintages at publication: move the Jul–Dec 2025 IPC to the confirmed 2026 window, re-pull OCHA funding-received (FTS) and the latest monthly update, and re-date the WFP and DTM rolling figures.
- State no perpetrator as fact for the Puntland strikes HRW reports as 'unidentified'; keep the March 2026 Baidoa takeover recorded as a federal-vs-state clash, not an Al-Shabaab operation.
## Source registry
- `som-ocha-hnrp-2026` — [UN OCHA — Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026](); humanitarian; 2026-01-26
- `som-ocha-drought-2026` — [UN OCHA — Somalia 2025–2026 Drought Emergency Situation Report No. 5](); humanitarian; 2026-04-06
- `som-wfp-2026` — [World Food Programme — Somalia emergency — WFP](); humanitarian; 2026-06-07
- `som-ipc-2025` — [IPC / FSNAU-Somalia (FAO) — Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (IPC / FSNAU-Somalia)](); humanitarian; 2025-09-23
- `som-unsc-2026` — [United Nations Security Council — UN Security Council on Somalia](); official\_position; 2026-06-01
- `som-aussom-2026` — [African Union — AUSSOM mission — African Union](); official\_position; 2025-12-23
- `som-acled-2026` — [ACLED — Somalia / Horn of Africa political violence](); research; 2026-04-01
- `som-hrw-2026` — [Human Rights Watch — World Report 2026: Somalia](); human\_rights; 2026-01-16
- `som-iom-dtm-2026` — [IOM — Displacement Tracking Matrix — IOM Somalia](); humanitarian; 2026-04-24