# Haiti Gang Crisis - Canonical dossier: [Web edition]() - Markdown edition: [Plain-text edition]() - Issue: Issue 010 - Rubric: Two Ledgers / Collapse - Byline: Totally Fine Foundation editorial desk - Reading time: 11 min - Last reviewed: 2026-08-20 > Over half the country is written into a humanitarian plan, a million and a half are driven from home, and the quarter's dead are counted by the thousand — but the most disciplined reading of who did the killing does not point where the reflex expects. Over all of it sits a state with no elected officials and a foreign force whose mandate is vast and whose effect is unproven. ## Cover - Kicker: Field dossier / Americas / humanitarian crisis - Cover lines: Half a country, costed at 6.4 million in need — the plan can afford 4.2 million of them. / Nearly 1.5 million driven from home. The capital passed 300,000 for the first time on record. / The state, not the gangs, accounts for most of the quarter's casualties — BINUH's own count. / A force authorized at 5,550. Roughly 400 had arrived. The gangs still hold most of the capital. #### Hero visual provenance - Caption: Port-au-Prince from the air (archival aerial view). By mid-2026 armed groups held roughly 90 per cent of the capital, and over half the country was written into a humanitarian plan. - Alt text: An aerial view of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. - Credit: US Navy (public domain) - Rights / license: Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ## Metrics ### 6.4M — People in humanitarian need (2026) - Category: humanitarian need - Caveat: Over half the population; the plan targets only 4.2M. The 6.4M-vs-4.2M gap is a funding/access limit, not a smaller crisis; the appeal was under 20% funded in April. **Source trail:** [UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan]() (`haiti-ocha-hnrp-2026`) #### Visual provenance - Caption: Assessed need, and the affordable target. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: costed at 6.4 million. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### ~1.5M — Internally displaced - Category: displacement - Caveat: IOM DTM record high (enumerated 1,450,254, Dec 2025); Port-au-Prince passed 300,000 for the first time. Rolling — an earlier snapshot read 1.4M. Forced returns (110,000+) are a separate category, not added. **Source trail:** [IOM — Haiti internal displacement (IOM / DTM)]() (`haiti-iom-dtm-2026`); [UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan]() (`haiti-ocha-hnrp-2026`) #### Visual provenance - Caption: Each round reads higher. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: displacement trajectory. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### 5.7M — Acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+) - Category: food security - Caveat: About 52% of the population (Sep 2025–Feb 2026), of whom 3.8M in Crisis and 1.9M in Emergency. Keep separate from the Mar–Jun 2026 projection (~5.83M); Phase 3 and Phase 4 are distinct bands. **Source trail:** [IPC — Haiti Acute Food Insecurity, Sept 2025 – June 2026]() (`haiti-ipc-2025`); [UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan]() (`haiti-ocha-hnrp-2026`) #### Visual provenance - Caption: Bands, not to be summed past their total. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: IPC phases. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### 1,642 — People killed, Q1 2026 - Category: human cost / lethal - Caveat: Plus 745 injured (kept separate). BINUH attributes \>69% to security-force operations, 27% to gangs, 4% to self-defence — responsibility shares of the killed-plus-injured pool, not to be merged with the 1,642. **Source trail:** [BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026]() (`haiti-binuh-2026`) #### Visual provenance - Caption: The state, not the gangs, accounts for most. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: casualty attribution. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### 27 / day — Gender-based violence - Category: human cost / GBV - Caveat: Women and girls assaulted daily, mostly rape (OCHA); separately 292+ gang-attributed victims in Q1 2026, mainly girls aged 12–17 (BINUH). Systematically under-reported — a documented floor; no victim or survivor is named. **Source trail:** [UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan]() (`haiti-ocha-hnrp-2026`); [BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026]() (`haiti-binuh-2026`) ### 5,550 / ~400 — The international force - Category: security / intervention - Caveat: Resolution 2793 authorizes a 5,550-ceiling Gang Suppression Force; roughly 400 Chadian troops had arrived by late Apr 2026 (MSS peaked near 991, left 27 Apr). Mandate ≠ result; a mandate is not restored control. **Source trail:** [UN Security Council — MSS to Gang Suppression Force (Resolution 2793)]() (`haiti-unsc-2793`) #### Visual provenance - Caption: Authorization is not arrival. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: the force. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### ~90% — Gang territorial control (attributed, dated) - Category: security / assessment - Caveat: Of Port-au-Prince (UNODC, ACLED, UN, late 2025–Apr 2026). An estimate that goes stale fast and varies by source, date and definition — always attributed and dated, never a bare settled fact; UN News separately estimates Viv Ansanm at ~70%. **Source trail:** [ACLED — Haiti political-violence data]() (`haiti-acled-2025`); [UN Security Council — MSS to Gang Suppression Force (Resolution 2793)]() (`haiti-unsc-2793`) ## The country that keeps two ledgers. ### Half a country, written into a plan OCHA reads Haiti in 2026 as a standing emergency. Its plan counts 6.4 million people — over half the population — in need of assistance, up from 6 million the year before. Against that, the plan asks US$880 million to reach 4.2 million of them, and by April it had received less than a fifth of the money. The gap between the 6.4 million assessed as in need and the 4.2 million the plan can afford to target is not a smaller crisis; it is a funding-and-access limit, and OCHA keeps the two numbers apart. Underneath the ledger sit the drivers, each its own distinct count: 1.4 million already displaced by armed groups at the launch, 5.7 million short of food every day, 27 women and girls assaulted daily, 1,600 schools shut and roughly 250,000 children out of education. These are planning figures from a body that is also appealing for funds — authoritative for the humanitarian sector, and attributed as such. **Source trail:** [UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan]() (`haiti-ocha-hnrp-2026`) #### Visual provenance - Caption: A funding-and-access limit, not a smaller crisis. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: costed at 6.4 million. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### The map of the displaced keeps moving The engine of the humanitarian crisis is displacement, and IOM counts it as a running tally that goes stale between rounds. Its Displacement Tracking Matrix put Haiti's internally displaced at nearly 1.5 million by June 2026 — a record, enumerated at 1,450,254 in the December cycle and up from about 1.3 million a year earlier. In May, renewed attacks on Cité Soleil displaced more than 18,000 people within days, pushing Port-au-Prince above 300,000 internally displaced for the first time on record. The pressure is spreading: armed attacks in the South-East Department, once a refuge for people fleeing elsewhere, displaced more than 5,000. A separate category sits alongside and must not be added to it — more than 110,000 Haitians forcibly returned to the country since the start of 2026, many arriving with nothing into areas already unsafe. **Source trail:** [IOM — Haiti internal displacement (IOM / DTM)]() (`haiti-iom-dtm-2026`); [UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan]() (`haiti-ocha-hnrp-2026`) #### Visual provenance - Caption: A record, and still climbing. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: displacement trajectory. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### The quarter, and where the bodies came from BINUH, the UN's office in Haiti, turns three months into an accountability ledger, and its central finding inverts the reflex. In the first quarter of 2026, it recorded at least 1,642 people killed and 745 injured — kept as separate categories. The unsettling part is the attribution. BINUH puts more than 69 per cent of those killed or injured on operations carried out by security forces against gangs, sometimes supported by a private military company using drones; 27 per cent on the gangs themselves; and 4 per cent on self-defence groups. These are responsibility shares of the same casualty pool, and they describe the anti-gang campaign generating large civilian harm rather than the gangs acting alone. Of the victims of drone strikes, BINUH counts 69 who were members of the population, five of them children; a further 33 people it attributes to executions or attempted summary executions involving police. The gangs' own toll is recorded distinctly: sexual violence against more than 292 victims, mainly women and girls aged 12 to 17, used as a means of collective punishment in the areas they hold. That figure is a documented floor — sexual violence is systematically under-reported — and no survivor is named. **Source trail:** [BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026]() (`haiti-binuh-2026`) #### Visual provenance - Caption: The finding that inverts the reflex. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: casualty attribution. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### Three sets of hands, and a wider window Human Rights Watch refuses to let one number stand for Haiti, and disaggregates the toll by who caused it. Citing OHCHR, it records criminal groups as having killed at least 4,384 people between January and September 2025, injured 1,899 and kidnapped 491. Against that it sets the state's own toll for an overlapping period: at least 3,199 killed during police operations between January and August, 17 per cent of them not involved in the clashes, and at least 1,243 more killed in 141 drone strikes between March 2025 and January 2026 that it ties to a prime-ministerial task force and the private firm Vectus Global. These are separate lines with different sources and windows, and must not be added to the gang figure. The abuse reaches the intervention itself: a UN report found the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission responsible for four cases of sexual violence, including the rape of a 12-year-old girl and two 16-year-olds. Kenya calls the allegations unsubstantiated; the UN says only one of the four cases was internally investigated. HRW is an advocate relaying UN primaries, so its totals are attributed and corroborated, not treated as independent counts. **Source trail:** [Human Rights Watch — Haiti — country reporting and investigations]() (`haiti-hrw-2026`) #### Visual provenance - Caption: Separate lines, never added. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: disaggregated toll. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original sources linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### A mandate is not a restored city The Security Council retired one force and authorized a much larger one, and the distance between authorization and effect is the story. Resolution 2793, adopted on 30 September 2025, folds the Kenyan-led MSS mission into a Gang Suppression Force with a 12-month mandate, a personnel ceiling of 5,550 and authorization to conduct intelligence-led operations to neutralise gangs. The predecessor collapsed on a fault line the new force inherits: the MSS peaked near 991, ran on voluntary funding that secured only about US$400 million of an estimated US$600 million, and left when its final Kenyan contingent departed on 27 April 2026. Its replacement had, by late April, roughly 400 Chadian troops on the ground, with fully operational projected for October 2026. The mandate is vast; the arrival is not. On the ground the reordering is what independent monitors record rather than any restoration of control: ACLED ranks Haiti the world's eighth most severe conflict in 2025, up from eleventh, on more than 4,500 killed by political violence in a single index year. And the estimate everyone reaches for, gang control of Port-au-Prince, is put at around 90 per cent by UNODC, by ACLED and by the UN across late 2025 and April 2026 — a figure that varies by source, date and definition, and that this dossier attributes and dates rather than states as fixed. **Source trail:** [UN Security Council — MSS to Gang Suppression Force (Resolution 2793)]() (`haiti-unsc-2793`); [ACLED — Haiti political-violence data]() (`haiti-acled-2025`) #### Visual provenance - Caption: The mandate exists; its effect is unproven. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: the force. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### ICRC reports clashes affecting Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, central region and South-East According to the ICRC, since mid-April 2026 armed clashes have affected several areas of Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, Haiti's central region and, more recently, the South-East. The ICRC reports that areas previously considered relatively safe are becoming unsafe, leaving people with fewer places to seek shelter. The ICRC reports that the spread of armed violence is further worsening living conditions for communities that were already severely affected. The ICRC also states that the violence is contributing to repeated displacement, reduced access to health care and the erosion of livelihoods, with consequences disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable people. The ICRC warns that the prospect of new offensive operations is raising fears of increased humanitarian consequences if necessary precautions are not taken. **Source trail:** [BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026]() (`haiti-binuh-2026`) ## Actors and positions ### Haitian gangs / the Viv Ansanm coalition - Role: Armed non-state groups controlling most of metropolitan Port-au-Prince. - Confidence: high - Position: Viv Ansanm, formed in September 2023 from the G-9 and G-Pèp blocs, framed itself at formation as protecting civilians in the neighbourhoods it holds, and cast its campaign as a revolt against a corrupt, unelected state and foreign intervention. - Supporter framing: Presents its rule as protection and order where the state is absent. - Opposing account: The state, the US and the UN class it as terrorist gangs that kidnap, extort and use sexual violence. - Independent assessment: Independent monitors treat the 'protection' framing as largely instrumental — the February 2024 prison break and airport assault, and the documented pattern of kidnappings and sexual violence, are inconsistent with a civilian-protection posture. Its statements are recorded as own-position only. **Source trail:** [BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026]() (`haiti-binuh-2026`); [ACLED — Haiti political-violence data]() (`haiti-acled-2025`) ### Haitian transitional authorities and the National Police - Role: The de facto government and its primary security instrument, with no elected officials since 7 February 2026. - Confidence: high - Position: Frame the crisis as a security emergency requiring restoration of state authority; promise 'security, dialogue and elections' and welcome the international force against what they and the US call terrorist gangs. - Supporter framing: Present the anti-gang campaign as restoring state authority. - Opposing account: Rights bodies document the state's own role in civilian harm. - Independent assessment: Independent bodies corroborate both the state's weakness and its role in civilian harm: BINUH puts more than 69 per cent of Q1 2026 casualties on security-force operations and documents police summary executions; HRW and others describe a governance vacuum and a near-collapsed health system. **Source trail:** [BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026]() (`haiti-binuh-2026`); [Human Rights Watch — Haiti — country reporting and investigations]() (`haiti-hrw-2026`) ### The Kenya-led MSS / Gang Suppression Force - Role: The externally authorized security force, transitioning from the under-strength MSS to a Gang Suppression Force. - Confidence: high - Position: Authorized to neutralise, isolate and deter gangs; its leadership states an intent to degrade gangs to a level Haitian institutions can sustainably manage, and the UN frames the deployment as an 'opportunity.' - Supporter framing: Presents the force as the instrument to reclaim the capital. - Opposing account: Monitors record the intervention has not restored control, and a UN report attributes four sexual-violence cases to the MSS. - Independent assessment: Mandate, action and result kept distinct: on current indicators the intervention has not restored control — gangs still hold roughly 90 per cent of the capital, 2,300+ have been killed in 2026, and the force had barely begun foot patrols in June 2026. Its mandate exists; its effect is unproven. **Source trail:** [UN Security Council — MSS to Gang Suppression Force (Resolution 2793)]() (`haiti-unsc-2793`); [Human Rights Watch — Haiti — country reporting and investigations]() (`haiti-hrw-2026`) ### Civilians and displaced communities - Role: The population bearing the crisis — killed, kidnapped, subjected to sexual violence, displaced and cut off from food and health care. - Confidence: high - Position: Demands range from security and services to deep distrust of both the gangs and an unelected government. - Supporter framing: Humanitarian bodies quantify the toll and centre civilian protection. - Opposing account: No side's protective claims are borne out by the indicators. - Independent assessment: The group with the least voice in the framing and the greatest evidential weight of harm — about 1.5 million internally displaced (IOM), 6.4 million in need and roughly 5.9 million facing acute food insecurity (OCHA); many are trapped between gang predation and the civilian harm caused by anti-gang operations. **Source trail:** [IOM — Haiti internal displacement (IOM / DTM)]() (`haiti-iom-dtm-2026`); [UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan]() (`haiti-ocha-hnrp-2026`) ## Claims and evidence ### The international security support is restoring control in Haiti. - Claimant: State and intervention framing - Evidence status: disputed - Counterclaim: The MSS deployed under-strength and underfunded and gangs expanded during its tenure. - Independent assessment: Disputed: as of June 2026 gangs still hold ~90 per cent of the capital, 2,300+ have been killed in 2026, and the Gang Suppression Force had barely begun operations. The existence of a mandate is not the same as territorial control; the framing is forward-looking. **Source trail:** [UN Security Council — MSS to Gang Suppression Force (Resolution 2793)]() (`haiti-unsc-2793`); [ACLED — Haiti political-violence data]() (`haiti-acled-2025`) #### Visual provenance - Caption: Mandate exists; control does not follow. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: the force. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### Haiti's crisis is primarily a policing problem, best solved by an anti-gang force. - Claimant: Security-first framing - Evidence status: disputed - Counterclaim: Analysts argue the crisis is at least equally governance collapse, impunity, illicit arms flows and food/health-system breakdown. - Independent assessment: Disputed: no elected officials since 7 February 2026, health facilities closed, ~5.9M acutely food-insecure, cholera resurgent — none of which a combat force resolves, and BINUH's 69 per cent finding suggests force alone can worsen civilian harm. **Source trail:** [Human Rights Watch — Haiti — country reporting and investigations]() (`haiti-hrw-2026`); [UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan]() (`haiti-ocha-hnrp-2026`); [BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026]() (`haiti-binuh-2026`) ### Gangs control a single fixed share (~90%) of Port-au-Prince; the capital is uniformly inaccessible. - Claimant: Common shorthand - Evidence status: disputed - Counterclaim: The estimates vary by source, date and definition and describe a shifting, neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood contest. - Independent assessment: Disputed: UN News cites 'up to 90%' while separately estimating Viv Ansanm at ~70%; ACLED declines percentages and maps violence by neighbourhood; BINUH notes security advances in certain areas of downtown. Any single percentage goes stale fast and conflates 'influence' with 'control.' **Source trail:** [ACLED — Haiti political-violence data]() (`haiti-acled-2025`); [BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026]() (`haiti-binuh-2026`) #### Visual provenance - Caption: The capital is not the whole country. - Alt text: Map of Haiti's departments. - Credit: Wikimedia Commons contributors - Rights / license: CC BY 2.5, via Wikimedia Commons - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ## Language record ### UN OCHA - Role: HNRP 2026 launch - Context: The displacement figure at the December 2025 launch, since superseded by IOM's 1.5 million. Quotation text is available in the web edition and the cited original source; it is not republished in this machine-readable edition. **Source:** [UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan]() (`haiti-ocha-hnrp-2026`) ### UN OCHA - Role: Humanitarian Coordinator - Context: On the scale of sexual violence — a documented floor, no survivor named. Quotation text is available in the web edition and the cited original source; it is not republished in this machine-readable edition. **Source:** [UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan]() (`haiti-ocha-hnrp-2026`) ### BINUH - Role: Q1 2026 report - Context: The finding that inverts the reflex — a responsibility share of the same casualty pool. Quotation text is available in the web edition and the cited original source; it is not republished in this machine-readable edition. **Source:** [BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026]() (`haiti-binuh-2026`) ### BINUH - Role: Q1 2026 report - Context: The gangs' share, kept distinct from the security-force share. Quotation text is available in the web edition and the cited original source; it is not republished in this machine-readable edition. **Source:** [BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026]() (`haiti-binuh-2026`) ### IOM - Role: June 2026 - Context: A record high, with the capital above 300,000 for the first time. Quotation text is available in the web edition and the cited original source; it is not republished in this machine-readable edition. **Source:** [IOM — Haiti internal displacement (IOM / DTM)]() (`haiti-iom-dtm-2026`) ### Human Rights Watch - Role: Relaying a UN report - Context: On the Kenya-led MSS; Kenya contests the allegations, one case investigated. Quotation text is available in the web edition and the cited original source; it is not republished in this machine-readable edition. **Source:** [Human Rights Watch — Haiti — country reporting and investigations]() (`haiti-hrw-2026`) ## Timeline ### 2021-07-07 — President Jovenel Moïse assassinated - Event type: conflict\_start - Confidence: high Haiti's president Jovenel Moïse was assassinated in his private residence in Port-au-Prince, plunging the country into political turmoil. The violence coincided with a major earthquake in August 2021. **Source trail:** [International Crisis Group — Haiti Crisis — International Crisis Group]() (`src-haiti-icg`) ### 2024-03-05 — Gang coalition seizes control of major Port-au-Prince arteries and National Penitentiary - Event type: conflict\_escalation - Confidence: high Gang coalition led by Jimmy 'Barbecue' Chérizier attacked the main port and seized the National Penitentiary, releasing approximately 4,000 inmates. Prime Minister Ariel Henry was stranded abroad and unable to return. **Source trail:** [UNOCHA — Haiti Humanitarian Situation — UNOCHA]() (`src-haiti-ocha`); [International Crisis Group — Haiti Crisis — International Crisis Group]() (`src-haiti-icg`) ### 2026-04-30 — 600,000 displaced; MSS mission struggling to restore order - Event type: displacement\_update - Confidence: high OCHA reported 600,000 IDPs in Haiti, primarily in Port-au-Prince. The Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support Mission has made limited headway against entrenched gang control, with operations constrained by funding shortfalls. **Source trail:** [UNOCHA — Haiti Humanitarian Situation — UNOCHA]() (`src-haiti-ocha`); [ReliefWeb — Haiti Crisis — ReliefWeb]() (`src-haiti-reliefweb`) ### 2026-04-15 — ICRC reports clashes affecting South-East more recently since mid-April 2026 - Event type: conflict\_escalation - Confidence: medium The ICRC reports that since mid-April 2026 armed clashes have affected several areas of Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, the central region and, more recently, the South-East. **Source trail:** [ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-08)]() (`src-haiti-humani-editorial-2026-08`) ### 2026-07-28 — Reported attack on Marmont section of Saint-Michel de l'Attalaye - Event type: conflict\_escalation - Confidence: medium Members of GCO de Savien, accompanied by Kokorat San Ras, reportedly attacked the 7th communal section of Marmont in the locality of Nan Paul on a market day, according to the 28 July 2026 rapid assessment published on ReliefWeb. The group was reported in the same assessment as 12 heavily armed individuals and reportedly established an illegal toll post, searching people traveling to or returning from the market. **Source trail:** [ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-08)]() (`src-haiti-humani-editorial-2026-08`) ### 2026-07-28 — Residents reportedly leave Marmont section following reported attack - Event type: displacement\_update - Confidence: medium Following the attack, residents reportedly left the Marmont section to seek refuge in other communes, according to the 28 July 2026 rapid assessment; no displacement total was provided. **Source trail:** [ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-08)]() (`src-haiti-humani-editorial-2026-08`) ## Visual essay ### Gallery image 01 #### Visual provenance - Caption: The finding that inverts the reflex: BINUH puts more than 69 per cent of the quarter's killed-and-injured on security-force operations against gangs, 27 per cent on the gangs, and 4 per cent on self-defence groups. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: of Q1 2026 casualties, 69 per cent from security-force operations, 27 per cent gangs, 4 per cent self-defence groups. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### Gallery image 02 #### Visual provenance - Caption: Port-au-Prince from the hills. By June 2026 IOM counted nearly 1.5 million displaced nationwide, with the capital above 300,000 for the first time on record. - Alt text: A view of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, from the hills above the city. - Credit: Elena Heredero - Rights / license: CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ## Linked visual references ### "More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026" - Photographer: BINUH / OHCHR - Publisher: United Nations - Recognition: UN human-rights monitoring - Why it matters: The UN quarterly report that names where the bodies came from — and finds the state's anti-gang campaign responsible for most of them. - Original: [Open reference]() #### The quarter, and where the bodies came from. BINUH turns three months into an accountability ledger, and its central finding inverts the reflex: more than 69 per cent of casualties came from security-force operations, not the gangs acting alone. The reference matters because Haiti's violence is routinely told as gangs against a besieged state. BINUH's own count keeps the killed and injured as separate categories, attributes responsibility shares of the same pool, and describes the anti-gang campaign generating large civilian harm. The gangs' toll is recorded distinctly — sexual violence against more than 292 victims, mainly girls aged 12 to 17, a documented floor with no survivor named. This dossier records the shares as BINUH did, and issues no verdict of its own. ## Media desk ### Haiti — departments - Publisher: Wikimedia Commons - Creator: Wikimedia Commons contributors - Date: Maintained file - Media type: map - Rights mode: direct\_image - Placement: Orientation map / geography - Caption: The capital is not the whole country: the displacement and hunger figures cluster in the West, but the departments that once absorbed the displaced now produce their own. - Why it matters: A rights-safe locator; geography context for a crisis spreading beyond Port-au-Prince, not a control map. The map belongs early because the single most misleading move is to read a capital-control percentage as the state of the whole country. It orients the ledgers that follow. - Original: [Open media record]() #### Visual provenance - Caption: Haiti's departments: the crisis centres on the Ouest department and Port-au-Prince, but armed attacks have spread into Artibonite, Centre and the South-East, once a refuge. - Alt text: Map of Haiti showing its departments. - Credit: Wikimedia Commons contributors - Rights / license: CC BY 2.5, via Wikimedia Commons - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### A mandate is not a restored city - Publisher: UN Security Council - Creator: Totally Fine Foundation - Date: 2026 - Media type: infographic - Rights mode: linked\_reference\_only - Placement: Security data surface - Caption: The Security Council retired one force and authorized a much larger one; the distance between authorization and effect is the story. - Why it matters: Mandate, arrival and result are kept strictly apart — a 5,550 ceiling is authorization, ~400 troops is arrival, 'fully operational' is a target. The surface exists because the reflex is to read a mandate as a restored city. On current indicators the intervention has not restored control — gangs still hold most of the capital. - Original: [Open media record]() #### Visual provenance - Caption: Mandate against arrival: Resolution 2793 authorizes a 5,550-strong Gang Suppression Force, but by late April 2026 roughly 400 Chadian troops had arrived, with 'fully operational' projected for October — a target, not an achieved state. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: a force authorized at 5,550 with roughly 400 troops on the ground. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ## Source readings ### The quarter, and where the bodies came from. - Registry ID: `haiti-binuh-2026` - Publisher: BINUH / OHCHR - Source type: human\_rights - Published: 2026-05-08 - Registry title: More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026 - Editorial note: The quarter as an accountability ledger — and a finding that inverts the reflex. - Original: [Open source]() BINUH turns three months into an accountability ledger, and its central finding inverts the reflex about who did the killing. In the first quarter of 2026 it recorded at least 1,642 people killed and 745 injured — kept as separate categories, not merged. The unsettling part is the attribution: BINUH puts more than 69 per cent of those killed or injured on operations carried out by security forces against gangs, sometimes supported by a private military company using drones; 27 per cent on the gangs themselves; and 4 per cent on self-defence groups. These are responsibility shares of the same casualty pool. Of the victims of drone strikes, BINUH counts 69 who were members of the population, five of them children; a further 33 people it attributes to executions or attempted summary executions involving police. The gangs' own toll is recorded distinctly: sexual violence against more than 292 victims, mainly women and girls aged 12 to 17 — a documented floor, systematically under-reported, and no survivor is named. On gang control of the capital this release gives no percentage, saying only that operations limited the territorial expansion of gangs in the heart of the capital. #### Takeaways - The 69/27/4 are responsibility shares of the same killed-and-injured pool — do not merge them with the 1,642. - Killed and injured stay as separate categories; three counting frames (BINUH Q1, OHCHR cumulative, a four-year child tally) must not be summed. - The sexual-violence figure is a documented floor; no survivor is named. #### Visual provenance - Caption: Responsibility shares of the same casualty pool, attributed to BINUH. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: 69 per cent security forces, 27 per cent gangs, 4 per cent self-defence. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### Half a country, written into a plan. - Registry ID: `haiti-ocha-hnrp-2026` - Publisher: UN OCHA - Source type: humanitarian - Published: 2025-12-18 - Registry title: Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan - Editorial note: A standing emergency, with the assessed need and the affordable target kept apart. - Original: [Open source]() OCHA reads Haiti in 2026 as a standing emergency, and keeps the assessed need and the affordable target carefully apart. Its plan counts 6.4 million people — over half the population — in need of assistance, up from 6 million the year before. Against that, it asks US$880 million to reach 4.2 million of them, and by April had received less than a fifth of the money. The gap between the 6.4 million assessed as in need and the 4.2 million the plan can afford to target is not a smaller crisis; it is a funding-and-access limit. Underneath the ledger sit the drivers, each its own distinct count: 1.4 million already displaced by armed groups at the launch, 5.7 million short of food every day, 27 women and girls assaulted daily, 1,600 schools shut and roughly 250,000 children out of education. These are planning figures from a body also appealing for funds — authoritative for the sector, and attributed as such. #### Takeaways - The 6.4M-vs-4.2M gap is a funding/access limit, not a smaller crisis. - Each driver is a distinct count; the 1.4M displacement figure here is superseded by IOM's later 1.5M. - The appeal is rolling and was under 20 per cent funded in April. #### Visual provenance - Caption: Half a country, written into a plan: 6.4 million in need — over half the population — but an US$880 million appeal that can afford to target only 4.2 million, and was under a fifth funded by April. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: 6.4 million in need, 4.2 million targeted, a US$880 million appeal under a fifth funded. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### The map of the displaced keeps moving. - Registry ID: `haiti-iom-dtm-2026` - Publisher: IOM - Source type: humanitarian - Published: 2026-06-05 - Registry title: Haiti internal displacement (IOM / DTM) - Editorial note: A running tally that goes stale between rounds — and a separate forced-return category. - Original: [Open source]() IOM counts displacement as a running tally that goes stale between rounds — worsening, so each round reads higher. Its Displacement Tracking Matrix put Haiti's internally displaced at nearly 1.5 million by June 2026 — a record, enumerated at 1,450,254 in the December cycle and up from about 1.3 million a year earlier. In May, renewed attacks on the Cité Soleil district displaced more than 18,000 people within days, pushing Port-au-Prince above 300,000 internally displaced for the first time on record. The pressure is spreading: armed attacks in the South-East Department, once a refuge, displaced more than 5,000. A separate category sits alongside and must not be added to it — more than 110,000 Haitians forcibly returned to the country since the start of 2026, many arriving with nothing into areas already unsafe. #### Takeaways - Attribute and date every figure to IOM/DTM; earlier snapshots read 1.4 million. - The DTM counts by round — a snapshot, not a ceiling. - Forced returns (110,000+ since January 2026) are a separate category, never added to the displacement total. #### Visual provenance - Caption: A running tally, each round higher: from about 1.3 million a year earlier to nearly 1.5 million by June 2026, with the capital above 300,000 for the first time. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: displacement trajectory to nearly 1.5 million. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### Half a country that cannot eat. - Registry ID: `haiti-ipc-2025` - Publisher: IPC - Source type: humanitarian - Published: 2025-10-10 - Registry title: Haiti Acute Food Insecurity, Sept 2025 – June 2026 - Editorial note: A five-band hunger ledger — snapshot and projection, Phase 3 and Phase 4, kept apart. - Original: [Open source]() The IPC converts Haiti's gang war into a five-band hunger ledger — read by classification, not headline. It put 5.7 million Haitians in Crisis or worse — Phase 3 and above, about 52 per cent of the population — across September 2025 to February 2026, of whom 3.8 million were in Crisis and 1.9 million in Emergency. The current snapshot is kept distinct from the forecast: for the March–June 2026 lean season the IPC projects deterioration to about 52 per cent of the population, roughly 5.83 million. One figure repays careful reading. Intensified food assistance is credited with lifting about 8,400 displaced people out of Catastrophe, the fifth and worst phase, into Emergency — a population moved by aid, not a count of people currently in Catastrophe. The IPC ties the numbers to their cause: farmers in gang-held areas forced to negotiate access to their own land, businesses closed, camps that raise the risk of disease and sexual violence. #### Takeaways - A food-security classification, not a casualty count; Phase 3 and Phase 4 are distinct bands, never summed past their total. - Keep the current snapshot (5.7M) separate from the projection (~5.83M). - The 8,400 is a population moved by aid out of Catastrophe, not a count of people in Catastrophe. #### Visual provenance - Caption: Hunger in bands, not to be summed past their total: 5.7 million in Crisis or worse (about 52 per cent of the population) — 3.8 million in Crisis, 1.9 million in Emergency — with aid credited with lifting about 8,400 out of Catastrophe. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: 5.7 million in IPC Phase 3+, of whom 3.8 million in Crisis and 1.9 million in Emergency. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### Three sets of hands, and a wider window. - Registry ID: `haiti-hrw-2026` - Publisher: Human Rights Watch - Source type: human\_rights - Published: 2026-04-13 - Registry title: Haiti — country reporting and investigations - Editorial note: The toll disaggregated by who caused it — overlapping lines kept apart. - Original: [Open source]() Human Rights Watch refuses to let one number stand for Haiti, and disaggregates the toll by who caused it. Citing OHCHR, it records criminal groups as having killed at least 4,384 people between January and September 2025, injured 1,899 and kidnapped 491. Against that it sets the state's own toll: at least 3,199 killed during police operations between January and August, 17 per cent of them not involved in the clashes, and at least 1,243 more killed in 141 drone strikes between March 2025 and January 2026 that it ties to a prime-ministerial task force and the private firm Vectus Global. These are separate lines with different sources and windows, and HRW keeps them so — they must not be added to the gang figure. The abuse reaches the intervention itself: a UN report found the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission responsible for four cases of sexual violence, including the rape of a 12-year-old girl and two 16-year-olds. Kenya calls the allegations unsubstantiated; the UN says only one of the four cases was internally investigated. HRW is an advocate relaying UN primaries, so its totals are attributed and corroborated. Its wider-window figure: over 8,200 people killed between January 2025 and March 2026. #### Takeaways - HRW disaggregates by perpetrator and keeps the police-operation, drone-strike and gang tolls as separate lines — never added. - It relays UN primaries (OHCHR, BINUH, UNODC, IOM) — attributed and corroborated, not independent counts. - Kenya contests the MSS sexual-violence allegations; the UN records them as findings, one case investigated. #### Visual provenance - Caption: Three sets of hands, kept apart: criminal groups killed at least 4,384 (Jan–Sep 2025, per OHCHR); police operations at least 3,199 (Jan–Aug); and 141 drone strikes at least 1,243 more (Mar 2025–Jan 2026). Different sources, windows and events — never added. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: gangs 4,384 killed, police operations 3,199, drone strikes 1,243 — separate lines. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original sources linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### The world's eighth-worst conflict. - Registry ID: `haiti-acled-2025` - Publisher: ACLED - Source type: research - Published: 2025-12-11 - Registry title: Haiti political-violence data - Editorial note: Event-coded political violence — not interchangeable with UN victim counts. - Original: [Open source]() ACLED counts Haiti the way it counts wars — and its event data is not interchangeable with the UN's victim counts. Over 4,500 Haitians killed by political violence in a single index year, December 2024 to November 2025, pushed the country from eleventh to eighth in its global severity ranking — a near-doubling of fatalities. A companion report estimates gangs control around 90 per cent of the capital and documents a 54 per cent rise in fatalities in clashes with gangs after 2025 drone operations. ACLED codes political violence broadly — gang, state, vigilante and mob deaths together — so its event-based figures are not interchangeable with OHCHR or BINUH victim counts and must be attributed separately. The 90 per cent control estimate is date-sensitive and varies by source and definition. #### Takeaways - ACLED's event-based figures are not interchangeable with UN victim counts — attribute separately. - The ~90 per cent control estimate goes stale fast and varies by source, date and definition. - ACLED data carries no open licence; the figures are rebuilt natively with attribution. #### Visual provenance - Caption: Counted the way ACLED counts wars: over 4,500 killed by political violence in a single index year pushed Haiti from the world's eleventh to eighth most severe conflict — an event-coded count, distinct from the UN's victim tallies. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: Haiti the world's eighth most severe conflict in 2025, up from eleventh. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### A mandate is not a restored city. - Registry ID: `haiti-unsc-2793` - Publisher: UN Security Council - Source type: official\_position - Published: 2025-09-30 - Registry title: MSS to Gang Suppression Force (Resolution 2793) - Editorial note: A mandate authorized, not a city restored — mandate, arrival and result kept apart. - Original: [Open source]() The Security Council retired one force and authorized a much larger one — and the distance between authorization and effect is the story. Resolution 2793, adopted on 30 September 2025 by 12 votes to none with three abstentions, folds the Kenyan-led MSS mission into a Gang Suppression Force with a 12-month mandate, a personnel ceiling of 5,550 and authorization to conduct intelligence-led operations to neutralise gangs. The predecessor collapsed on a fault line the new force inherits: the MSS was ceilinged at 2,500, peaked near 991, ran on voluntary funding that secured only about US$400 million of an estimated US$600 million, and left when its final Kenyan contingent departed on 27 April 2026. Its replacement had, by late April, roughly 400 Chadian troops on the ground, with fully operational projected for October 2026 — a target, not an achieved state. The mandate is vast; the arrival is not. On the ground, monitors record the reordering, not a restoration of control: gangs still hold roughly 90 per cent of the capital. #### Takeaways - Keep mandate (5,550 ceiling), action (~400 troops) and result strictly apart. - The 'five times the size' framing is an own-position claim of ambition, not evidence of capability. - The intervention's effect is unproven; the estimate everyone reaches for, ~90 per cent control, is a dated figure. #### Visual provenance - Caption: Authorization is not arrival; arrival is not result. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: 5,550 authorized, ~400 arrived. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### A supply chain it cannot afford to solve. - Registry ID: `haiti-wfp-2026` - Publisher: World Food Programme - Source type: humanitarian - Published: 2026-04-17 - Registry title: Haiti — World Food Programme - Editorial note: Collapse rendered as a supply chain it cannot afford to solve. - Original: [Open source]() WFP renders Haiti's collapse as a supply chain — the register procurement, the subject starvation. It reports about 5.8 million people, roughly half the country, without enough to eat, over 1.8 million at emergency levels, and 1.4 million driven from home since 2023, against which it reached 2.7 million in 2025 and now asks US$332 million to keep going. Its flat 5.8 million blends IPC periods — a current 5.7 million against a March–June 2026 projection — so the figure is attributed and dated here; the 1.4 million displacement figure it carries is an older DTM round, now superseded, and an undated malnutrition line traces to an older analysis presented as current. #### Takeaways - WFP is both responder and appellant — attribute every figure, and date the blended 5.8 million. - Its displacement figure is an older DTM round, superseded by IOM's 1.5 million. - Keep the WFP appeal (US$332M) distinct from the OCHA-wide plan (US$880M). #### Visual provenance - Caption: The register is procurement; the subject is starvation: about 5.8 million without enough to eat, 1.8 million at emergency levels, against which WFP reached 2.7 million in 2025 and now asks US$332 million to keep going. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: 5.8 million without enough to eat, 2.7 million reached in 2025. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ## Analysis shelf ### "More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026" - Publisher: BINUH / OHCHR - Type: report - Why it matters: The UN count that attributes most of the quarter's casualties to security-force operations, not the gangs alone. - Position note: UN human-rights monitoring; responsibility shares attributed to BINUH. - Original: [Open source]() #### Visual provenance - Caption: Where the bodies came from. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: casualty attribution. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### Haiti — country reporting - Publisher: Human Rights Watch - Type: investigation - Why it matters: The toll disaggregated by perpetrator — gangs, police operations, drone strikes — kept as separate lines. - Position note: Advocacy monitor relaying UN primaries; totals attributed and corroborated. - Original: [Open source]() #### Visual provenance - Caption: Three sets of hands, kept apart. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: disaggregated toll. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original sources linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan - Publisher: UN OCHA - Type: report - Why it matters: The humanitarian ledger — need, target, displacement, food, GBV — kept apart from the lethal ledger. - Position note: Humanitarian planning source; authoritative but appeal-driven. - Original: [Open source]() #### Visual provenance - Caption: The humanitarian ledger. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: costed at 6.4 million. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### Haiti political-violence data - Publisher: ACLED - Type: dataset - Why it matters: The event-coded severity ranking — Haiti the world's eighth-worst conflict — distinct from UN victim tallies. - Position note: Conflict-data monitor; event-based, not interchangeable with victim counts. - Original: [Open source]() #### Visual provenance - Caption: Counted the way ACLED counts wars. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: ACLED severity. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ## Media shelf ### Haiti — departments map - Publisher: Wikimedia Commons - Type: media - Why it matters: A rights-safe locator for a crisis spreading beyond the capital into Artibonite, Centre and the South-East. - Position note: Reusable CC BY-SA asset; geography, not a control map. - Original: [Open source]() #### Visual provenance - Caption: The capital is not the whole country. - Alt text: Map of Haiti's departments. - Credit: Wikimedia Commons contributors - Rights / license: CC BY 2.5, via Wikimedia Commons - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ### Haiti — World Food Programme - Publisher: World Food Programme - Type: media - Why it matters: The food-assistance ledger — half the country without enough to eat, against what WFP can afford. - Position note: Humanitarian source; figures attributed and dated, appeal distinct from the OCHA plan. - Original: [Open source]() #### Visual provenance - Caption: The register is procurement; the subject is starvation. - Alt text: Editorial data surface: WFP. - Credit: Totally Fine Foundation - Rights / license: Project editorial graphic; original source linked - Asset: [View image]() - Original / provenance: [Open source]() ## Open questions - Refresh every rolling figure at publication day: displacement (IOM DTM latest round), OCHA funding-received (FTS), the latest BINUH quarter (Q2 2026 will supersede the Q1 1,642), and the gang-control estimates. - Hold the two ledgers apart on any dashboard: the humanitarian counts (in-need / displaced / food-insecure / GBV / children) and the lethal counts (killed / injured, and the gang-vs-state-vs-self-defence shares) are distinct populations and must never be summed. - Keep every gang-control percentage attributed and dated, never a bare settled fact; note that estimates vary by source, date and definition and conflate 'influence' with 'control.' - Keep women's, girls' and children's harm centred while holding the food / displacement / governance / force structure intact; never name or identify a victim or survivor. - Keep mandate, arrival and result distinct for the international force — a 5,550 ceiling is authorization, ~400 troops is arrival, 'fully operational by October 2026' is a target. ## Source registry - `haiti-binuh-2026` — [BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026](); human\_rights; 2026-05-08 - `haiti-ocha-hnrp-2026` — [UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan](); humanitarian; 2025-12-18 - `haiti-iom-dtm-2026` — [IOM — Haiti internal displacement (IOM / DTM)](); humanitarian; 2026-06-05 - `haiti-ipc-2025` — [IPC — Haiti Acute Food Insecurity, Sept 2025 – June 2026](); humanitarian; 2025-10-10 - `haiti-hrw-2026` — [Human Rights Watch — Haiti — country reporting and investigations](); human\_rights; 2026-04-13 - `haiti-acled-2025` — [ACLED — Haiti political-violence data](); research; 2025-12-11 - `haiti-unsc-2793` — [UN Security Council — MSS to Gang Suppression Force (Resolution 2793)](); official\_position; 2025-09-30 - `haiti-wfp-2026` — [World Food Programme — Haiti — World Food Programme](); humanitarian; 2026-04-17